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THE DOOR FINALLY OPENS TO CHALLENGE AGENCY
DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THE ENVIRONMENT
Board of County Commissioners ofSumner County v. Bremby'
I. INTRODUCTION
Over 22 years ago, Kansas enacted the Act for Judicial Review
and Civil Enforcement of Agency Actions ("KJRA") to provide uniform
2procedures to challenge agency actions. In those years, very few courts
even mentioned K.S.A. § 77-611(b), which grants persons standing if they
become parties to the agency proceeding that led to the challenged action.
However, the minimal use of this section makes this case no less
extraordinary.
In a case of first impression, the Sumner County Board, citizens,
and Tri-County Association challenged the issuance of a landfill permit as
parties to the agency proceeding and argued that the landfill's potential
deficiencies could have an effect on property and water quality in the area.
After 22 years, the Court finally clarified how a person becomes a party to
an agency proceeding and ultimately granted the parties standing. This
note will explore the Court's holding and analysis, compare the Court's
interpretation of K.S.A. § 77-611(b) to other states that have the same
standing provision, explore the speculative and generalized environmental
injury that the Court accepts as sufficient to fulfill the traditional standing
test, and comment on the potential environmental and developmental
impacts of this holding.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Waste Connections applied, in August 2002, to the Kansas
Department of Health and Environment ("KDHE") for a permit to
construct and operate a municipal solid waste landfill. In response, the
' 189 P.3d 494 (Kan. 2008).
2 Martha J. Coffian, Procedures Under the Kansas Act for Judicial Review and Civil
Enforcement ofAgency Actions, K.S.A. 77-601 Et Seq., 76-Feb J. KAN.
3 Bd of County Comm'rs ofSumner County, 189 P.3d at 498.
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Board of Commissioners of Sumner County ("Board") had a study
conducted to evaluate the location site.4 The study revealed many
environmental and regulatory deficiencies which were reported to the
KDHE during a comment period.5 The KDHE held public hearings in
Harper County concerning the permit where Tri-County members and Mr.
Holland, a member of Tri-County owning a life estate north of the landfill
site, expressed concerns about environmental issues and the landfill's
location.6
The KDHE issued the permit in August 2005.7 The Board, Tri-
County, and Mr. Holland ("appellants") filed a petition under the KJRA.
Appellants claimed standing under K.S.A. § 77-611(b) as parties to the
agency proceedings that led to the agency action.8 The petition alleged
that the KDHE failed to take into account environmental concerns with the
proposed landfill and that if the landfill leaks, the leakage could
contaminate the ground water in the area and the Chikaskia River as well
as cause damage to real property bordering the site. 9
Waste Connections intervened and filed a motion to dismiss
arguing that the appellants have not suffered an injury.' 0 The District
Court, ignoring the injury argument, granted the motion holding that the
KDHE did not have a 'proceeding' as defined by K.S.A. § 77-611(b), and
4
5Id6 Id. "Tri-County is an organization formed to preserve and enhance the quality of life in
Harper, Kingman, and Sumner Counties and to promote environmental protection." Id.
Mr. Holland's property contains a pond which drains a portion of the area where the
landfill would be located. Id
7 Id. At the time of issuing the permit, KDHE did not make any reference to the
appellant's environmental concerns. KDHE did respond to public comments and in the
summary section revealed that of the "317 units of communication regarding the
proposed landfill, 290 expressed opposition." Id. Only 20 expressed approval. Id.
Id. The court quickly dismissed K.S.A. § 77-611(d) finding the statute inapplicable to
the present facts. Id at 499.
9 Id. at 498-99. The Chikaski River is a source of water for some residents of Sumner
County. Id. at 499. The real property potentially damaged by the landfill included Mr.
Holland's life estate and unspecified property of unspecified Tri-County members. Id. at
499.
1o Id. at 499. Waste Connections plead in the alternative for a more definite claim stating
that the allegation failed to state a cause of action. Id.
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therefore appellants did not have standing." The Court of Appeals
reversed, concluding that the appellants had standing as parties to the
agency proceedings under K.S.A. § 77-611(b).1 2 The court also found that
Tri-County met the requirements for organizational standing.' 3
The Kansas Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court.14 The
Court held that K.S.A. § 77-611(b) defines 'procedure' as the process that
an agency performs its statutory duties and therefore when a person or
organization submits written comments during a comment period or
voices concerns at a public hearing where the agency is carrying out its
statutory duty, that person is considered a party participating in the
proceedings and will have standing to challenge the outcome of that
proceeding. Furthermore, when a person or organization can show threat
of community water contamination and property damage if deficiencies in
a landfill exist, then that person or organization has sufficiently alleged an
injury for standing under the constitutional test.' 5
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Standing under K.S.A. § 77-611(b)
One method to obtain standing for judicial review of a final or
nonfinal agency action under the KIRA is through K.S.A. § 77-611(b)
which provides that a person has standing if that person "was a party to the
agency proceedings that led to the agency action."16 K.S.A. § 77-602(f)
1 Id.
12 Id. The court relied on Families Against Corporate Takeover v. Mitchell, 268 Kan. 803
(2000) to find that the permit process is a proceeding within the meaning of the statute.
Id.
13 Id. The court relied on Tri-County Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Bd. of Harper County
Comm'rs, 95 P.3d 1012 (2004) to hold that Tri-County met the associational standing
requirements. Id. The court made no findings concerning the Board's or Mr. Holland's
standing. Id.
14Id. at 507.
s Id. at 505-07.
16 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-611 (2007) provides that a person has standing in four
circumstance: "(a) A person to whom the agency action is specifically directed; (b) a
person who was a party to the agency proceedings that led to the agency action; (c) if the
614
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defines 'party to agency proceeding' as a person "allowed to intervene or
participate as a party in the proceeding."' Despite being enacted over 22
years ago, K.S.A. § 77-611(b) has rarely been mentioned.
MCI Telecommunications Corporation v. State Corporation
Commissioners of the State of Kansas, an unpublished trial court decision,
was the first court to use § 77-611(b) to grant standing.' 8 The Court found
that MCI Telecommunications participated in the agency proceeding by
filing a request for a hearing regarding AT&T's proposed Kansas
service. 19 However, K.S.A § 77-611(b) was not discussed by the appellate
court which granted the petitioners standing using K.A.R. § 82-1-232(b).20
In WS. Dickey Clay Manufacturing Company v. State Corporation
Commissioners of State of Kansas and the Gas Service Company,21 the
Supreme Court dismissed the appellants' argument for standing under
K.S.A. § 77-611(b). The Kansas Corporation Commission held a hearing
for a franchise agreement between the Gas Service and the City of
Pittsburg.22 An employee of Dickey Clay Manufacturing Company
("Dickey") attended the public hearing but did not formally enter an
appearance, present any testimony or otherwise participate. 23 The Court
rejected the allegation that Dickey had standing pursuant to K.S.A. § 77-
24611(b) because Dickey failed to participate at the hearing in any manner.
Standing under K.S.A. § 77-611(b) was not used again until 2000
in Families Against Corporate Takeover v. Mitchell and, for the first time,
the Supreme Court accepted appellants' argument. 25 The case involved a
challenged agency action is a rule and regulation, a person subject to that rule; or (d) a
person eligible for standing under another provision of law."
" Id. at § 77-602(f). The definition also includes if the party was named in the
proceeding or if the proceeding was specifically directed to the party, both of which are
inapplicable in the present case. Id.
"No. 59,613, 1987 Kan. App. Lexis 752 (Kan Ct. App. Jan. 29, 1987).
'
9 Id. at *2
20 Id. at *3. The statute was relevant since the situation involved an order issued without a
hearing. Id.
21 241 P.2d 744 (Kan. 1987).22 Id. at 587.23 Id. Dickey was a significant consumer of natural gas in the State of Kansas. Id. at 58624 Id. at 747.
25 1 P.3d 884, 890 (Kan. 2000).
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challenge of the KDHE's issuance of a National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System permit for a hog farm where members of Families
against Corporate Takeover ("FACT") submitted comments and
participated in the public hearing concerning the permit.26 FACT filed a
petition in the District Court asserting standing under § 77-611(b) as a
party that participated in the agency proceeding. 2 7 The Court concluded
that submission of a written comment and participation in a public hearing
is sufficient to be considered a party that participated in that agency
28proceeding.
Since 2000 and before the present case, only two cases have
mentioned K.S.A. § 77-611(b).29
B. Survey of 'Party to a Proceeding' in Other States
Although this is an issue of first impression in Kansas, 30 other
states have interpreted the same standing requirement. The following is a
brief survey of a few states' interpretation of that states' requirement but is
not an exhaustive review. This survey shows that states are not in
complete agreement on how a person becomes a party to an agency
decision or even what 'proceeding' means.
In State ex rel. DePonti Aviation Company, Incorporation v.
Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Air Commissioner, Relator assumed
incorrectly that its appearance and participation in a public hearing made it
26 Id. at 886. FACT also hired two consultants who also submitted comments at the
hearing. Id. 890.
27 Id. at 889.28 Id. at 890.
29 In Lawrence Ltd. P'ship v. Bd. of Douglas County Comm'rs, No. 91,356, 2004 WL
1178364 (Kan. Ct. App. May 21, 2004) the court barely discussed standing under K.S.A.
§ 77-611(b) because the plaintiffs did not seek judicial review of the Board of Tax
Appeal proceedings. The court held that the plaintiff was not a party to the proceeding
and did not have standing. Id. at *3. In Dorsey ex. rel. Dorsey v. Kan. Dept. Soc. and
Rehab. Serv., No. 92293, 2005 WL 81557, at *3 (Kan. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2005) the statute
is invoked but for the alternative definition of a party to whom the agency action was
directed.30 Bd. of County Comm'rs of Sumner County v. Bremby, 189 P.3d 494, 501 (Kan. 2008).
616
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a party to the proceeding. 31 The court refused to accept that simply
participating in a public hearing made a person a party to that proceeding.
Instead, the court defined the rule as a person who participated "as an
active contestant on the merits for the determination of issues of law on
fact and whose particular interest could be affected by the outcome of the
trial." 32
In Medical Waste Association, Incorporation v. Midwest Waste
Coalition, Incorporation, in Maryland, the court reasoned that since the
format of administrative agencies were designed to encourage citizen
participation, that in the absence of a different method specified by statute,
"anyone clearly identifying himself to the agency for the record as having
an interest in the outcome of a matter being considered by the
agency.. .becomes a party to the proceeding."33 Maryland has determined
that putting a name in writing as a protestor, 34 testifying before the
agency, 35 submitting into evidence a letter or protest,3 6 and identifying
one's self on an agency record as a party 37 are all sufficient for that person
to become a party to that agency proceeding.
In Indianapolis Downs, LLC v. Indiana Horse Racing Commission,
the appellate court held that by virtue of an invitation to comment and an
acceptance of that invitation by submission of a position statement, a
person becomes a party to the agency proceeding that led to the challenged
action. 38 In this case, the court found standing because Downs was invited
and submitted a comment concerning how funds of riverboat revenue
would be allocated.39
3 32 N.W.2d 560, 564 (Minn. 1948).32 d
33 612 A.2d 241, 249 (Md. 1990) (quoting Morris v. Howard Research & Dev. Corp., 365
A.2d 34, 37 (Md. 1976)).
34 Baxter v. Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals, 235 A.2d 536, 536 (Md. 1967).
35 Bryniarski v. Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals, 230 A.2d 289, 293-94 (Md. 1967).
36 Hertelendy v. Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals, 226 A.2d 672, 680 (Md. 1967).
37 DuBay v. Crane, 213 A.2d 487, 489 (Md. 1965).
3 827 N.E.2d 162, 170 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
39 Id. at 166, 170. However, that same year, the Indiana Supreme Court denied petitioners
standing when it voiced opposition to the permit at a public hearing; consequently the
court held that the company did not successfully intervene. Indiana Ass'n of Beverages
617
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In Wood v. Metropolitan Nashville & Davidson County
Government, in Tennessee, the appellate court denied petitioner the right
to intervene reasoning that having a general interest, attending the
hearings, and advocating his position does not make him a party to that
40
agency proceeding.
States also have different definitions of 'proceeding.' Washington
defines a 'proceeding' as "an act which is done by the authority or
direction of the court, agency, or tribunal, express or implied." 41 Colorado
defines a 'proceeding' as "any agency process for any rule or rule-making,
order or adjudication, or license or licensing."42 Missouri defines an
'agency proceeding' as "an adversary proceeding in a contested case in
which the state is represented by council..." 43
This survey demonstrates that many of the states that refuse to
allow a person's participation at a hearing or submission of a written
comment to be sufficient for that person to become a party to that agency
proceeding, refused due to the lack of a specialized injury requirement.
C. Requirement of Injury under the Kansas Standing Law
Kansas has been consistent in defining the test for an injury
sufficient for standing, requiring that the complainant suffer an actual
injury not shared by the general community. As early as 1965, the Kansas
Supreme Court in MW Watson, Incorporation v. City of Topeka held that
a private person may generally not maintain an action for mere public
Retailers, Inc. v. Indiana Alcohol and Tobacco Comm'n, 836 N.E.2d 255, 258 (Ind.
2005).
40 196 S.W.3d 152, 155, 159 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
41 Muckleshoot Indiana Tribe v. Wash. Dept. of Ecology, 50 P.3d 668, 677 (Wash Ct.
App. 2003). The court held that negotiations with federal, state, and city agencies over six
years to negotiate flow levels that would provide sufficient flow for fish habitat and
navigation were agency proceedings within that definition. Id. at 671, 677.
42 CF & I Steel, L.P. v. Air Pollution Control Div., 77 P.3d 933, 936 (Colo. Ct. App.
2003).
43 Braddock v. Mo. Dept. of Mental Health, 200 S.W.3d 78, 80 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006)
(citing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 536.085(1) (2000). The statute does not include proceedings for
determining the eligibility or entitlement of an individual to a monetary benefit or its
equivalent. Id.
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rights." Plaintiff must plead and prove that he has sustained a special
injury different from that of the public generally.45 However, even with
the presentation of this strict rule, the court held that although plaintiff will
be accorded no different treatment under the challenged ordinance than
other building contractors similarly situated, the denial of the ordinance
adversely affected his interest and thus granted standing.4 6
In Winters v. Kansas Hospital Service Association, in 1977, the
appellate court denied petitioner standing because the injury was
speculative and not imminent. 47 The appellate court based its decision on
the fact that at least four steps would have to take place before petitioner
was injured.48
In 1987, the court stated in Harrison by and through Harrison v.
Long that in order to have standing, the plaintiff must show that he
personally suffered an injury and that there was some casual connection
between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. 49 The court found
standing because the alleged conduct was forcing the plaintiff, a doctor, to
settle a malpractice suit which would not only increase his insurance rate
but also hurt his professional reputation.o
The appellate court reiterated that a petitioner must allege a special
injury separate from the general5 public in Linsea v. Board of County
Commissioners of Chase County. The court refused to grant petitioner
standing to challenge the removal of cedar trees from the courthouse
" 400 P.2d 689, 691 (Kan. 1965). In this case, plaintiff is challenging part of a city
ordinance requiring an applicant for a building fee to pay one-quarter cent per square feet
Eer day for any encroachment on public streets. Id.
46 Id. at 588.
47 562 P.2d 98, 102 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977).
48 Id. at 68-69. The four steps were: first, Winters required hospital services, a fact which
there was no evidentiary showing of probability, second Winters would have to be
furnished hospital services by Blue Cross, third Winters would not be a Blue Cross
subscriber at the time of hospitalization, and fourth that the Blue Cross member hospital
would make a retroactive adjustment for the fiscal year during which Winters is
hospitalized. Id. at 68.
49 734 P.2d 1155, 1158 (Kan.1987).
so id.
5 753 P.2d 1292, 1296 (Kan. Ct. App. 1988).
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because petitioner's injury was no different than the rest of the county
residents.52
Again in Bodine v. Osage County Rural Water District No. 7, in
1997, the Court refused to grant standing for mandamus to challenge a
water rate because the petitioner did not suffer a different injury from all
taxpayers since all county residents paid the same water rate.53
Again in 2008, the court reaffirmed that in order to have standing
"the plaintiff must show that the conduct of which he complains has
caused him to suffer an injury in fact that a favorable judgment will
redress." 54 Clearly, the Court has been consistent in stating that a
speculative or community injury is not sufficient to have standing.
However, as M W Watson, Inc. v. City of Topeka demonstrates, the Court
sometimes eases the requirement for a non-generalized injury when the
petitioner has suffered a specialized injury.55
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. Standard ofReview
Judge Davis delivered the opinion of the Court by first explaining
the importance of standing, emphasizing that a person and organization
has to fulfill the constitutional standing test even if that person or
organization fulfills the standing requirements of a statute. 56 The Court
also explained that it must accept all facts in the petition as true.57
"Id. at 1293, 1296.
1 263 Kan. 418, 421, 431 (1997).
54 State ex rel. Morrison v. Sebelius, 949 P.2d 1104, 1114 (Kan. 2008).
s 400 P.2d 689, 691 (Kan. 1965).
56 Bd. of County Comm'rs Sumner County v. Bremby, 189 P.3d 494, 498-99 (Kan.
2008).




B. Standing under the KJRA
First, the Court analyzed the definition of a 'party to an agency
proceeding' under § 77-602(f)(2) of the KJRA and concluded that
appellants will only have standing if the appellants were allowed to
participate as parties in the proceedings in which the permit was granted.58
The Court next defines 'party' under the KJRA. The Court rejects
Waste Connections' argument that the language in W.S. Dickey Clay Mgf
Co. v. Kansas,59 means that a person can only have standing if the agency
action was directed towards that person. 60 The Court used Black's Law
Dictionary and defined party as a person "who takes part in a
transaction."1 The Court reasoned that this definition is consistent with
the KJRA and concludes that whether a person is a party is determined by
that person's participation in a lawsuit or action. 62
The Court next defined 'agency proceeding' as the process by
which an agency carries out its statutory duties. 63 In forming this
definition, the Court placed significant importance on the fact that K.S.A.
§ 77-612(a) defines the rule making processes as a 'proceeding,' reasoning
that the rule making process is similar to the permit process. 4 The Court
also reasons that since K.S.A. § 77-615, which governs notice
requirements, specifically refers to 'adjudicative proceedings', if the
legislature intended the term proceeding to refer only to 'adjudication
58 Id. The court rejects Waste Connections' argument that the court of appeals erred in
focusing on the appellants' participation in the agency determination instead of the
appellants' participation as parties to the proceeding. Id.740 P.2d 585 (Kan. 1987).
6 0 Bd. of County Comm'rs of Sumner County v. Bremby, 189 P.3d 494, 501 (Kan. 2008).
The Court reasoned that since K.S.A § 77-611(b) was not the court's focus and Dickey
did not participate at all, this statement was merely dicta. Id.
61 Id. at 502 (quoting BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1154 (8d' ed. 1999).
62 d
63 Id. The Court notes that when engaging in statutory construction, it is important to
consider all parts of the statute together. Id. The Court rejected Waste Connections'
argument that the term is synonymous with adjudication. Id.
SId. at 502. The permit process is similar to the rule process because the rule process
begins with a proposed rule, public notice and comment period, and issuance of final
rule. Id. The permit process involves an application, a comment period and possible
public hearing, and then the denial or issuance of a permit. Id at 503.
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proceedings' in K.S.A. § 77-611(b), than the legislature would have
included the term adjudication before proceeding.6 5 Therefore, the Court
66holds that the permit process is a proceeding under the KJRA.
The Court accepted appellants' argument that since each appellant
participated in a public comment period offered during the permit process,
each had become a party to that agency proceeding. 67 The Court relied on
Families Against Corporate Takeover v. Mitchell,68 which stood for the
proposition that a interested person's submission of written comments
during a public notice period or comments during a public hearing held by
an agency qualify as sufficient participation to become parties to that
agency proceeding. 69 The Court reasoned that since the petition alleged
that the board submitted an environmental study in the comment period
and both Tri-County members and Mr. Holland voiced concern at the
public hearing, the appellants have standing as parties who participated in
the agency proceeding that led to the challenged action. 70
C. Constitutional Standing Test
The Court first explained the rules for standing. In order to have
individual standing, a person must demonstrate that he suffered a
cognizable injury and that a casual connection exists between the
challenged conduct and the injury.7 An association has standing to sue on
behalf of its members if the members would have had standing to sue
themselves, and the interest that the association wishes to protect is related
61d. at 502.
66id.
67 Id. at 504-05.
61 1 P.3d 884 (Kan. 2000). The court concluded that FACT had standing under the K.S.A.
§ 77-611(b) since members participated in the agency proceedings that led to the agency
action. Id. at 890.
69 Bd. of Comm'rs, 504. Per K.A.R. 28-29-6a(c), a public hearing will be held if there is
enough local interest and all comments will be part of the permit record and considered
when deciding to approve the permit. Id. at 503.70 Id. at 504-505.
71 Id. at 505.
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to the organization's interest. 72 The Court discussed each appellant
separately.
i. Tri-County
The Court held that Tri-County pleaded the requirements for
associational standing.73 The Court granted standing since the appellants
alleged that various members voiced concern at the public hearing, and
that if the landfill is unsuitable, the members will suffer damage to real
property and risk contamination to their soil, groundwater, and surface
water.74 Further, Tri-County's purpose as an organization is to preserve
and enhance the quality of life in Harper, Kingman, and Sumner Counties
and therefore the interest the association seeks to protect by this action is
to ensure that the landfill meets environmental standards. 75
ii. The Board
The Court held that the Board has standing since the petition
alleged that the Board is responsible for ensuring the health, safety, and
general welfare of its citizens and the proposed landfill could, if the site
does not meet regulatory and environmental standards, contaminate water
used by Sumner County residents. 76 Therefore, the Court held that since
the challenge is consistent with the Board's purposes, and the Board
alleged a potential harm linking to the issuance of the permit, the Board
has standing.77
7 2 Id. The court relies on NEA-Coffeyville v. v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 445, 996 P.2d 821
(Kan. 2000) for the test for associational standing. The court points out that neither test,
association nor individual standing, requires party participation. Id.
7 Id. at 506-07.
7 4 Id. at 506.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 507.
77 id.
623
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iii. Mr. Holland
The Court also holds that Mr. Holland has standing. Mr. Holland
died during this trial process and pleaded only a life estate in the land
directly north of the landfill site. 8 The Court, however, refused to dismiss
Mr. Holland's claim simply because the petition alleged that he owned a
life estate. However, the Court admits that if the property is a life estate,
Mr. Holland or his estate may no longer have an interest in the case. 79
D. Conclusion
The Court held that each appellant has standing under both K.S.A.
§ 77-611(b) and the constitutional test, and therefore remanded the case
for further proceedings.8 0
V. COMMENT
A. Party to an Agency Proceeding Defined
K.S.A. § 77-611(b) was enacted more than 22 years ago, and the
Kansas Court has just now explained how a person becomes a party to an
agency proceeding. In analyzing this section, the Court's methods and
conclusions are supported by logic and are consistent with sister states.
Despite the minimal use of this section, this holding will have
environmental and developmental impacts.
Resorting to similar statutes and Black's Law Dictionary are
common methods employed by courts to define ambiguous words.
Missouri, in Braddock v. Missouri Department of Mental Health, 8 2 and




81 Coffnan, supra note 2, at 21.
82 200 S.W.3d 78, 82 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 536.087.1 (2000)).




used statutes that clearly defined 'agency hearing.' Washington, like
Kansas, lacked a statute that clearly defined 'agency proceeding.'
Therefore, in Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Washington Department of
Ecology, the court relied on Black's Law Dictionary and chose the broader
definition of "an act which is done by authority or direction of the court,
agency, or tribunal, express or implied." 84 Washington and Kansas alike,
assumed that since the legislature did not place any limiting language on
agency proceeding, 'proceeding' had to be defined broader than just
adjudicative proceedings.85 Therefore, it seems that even if the Kansas
Court had resorted to Black's Law Dictionary as opposed to looking at
other statutes, the definition of proceeding would have been defined the
same. Further, this definition is consistent with other states' definition.
At first glance, Kansas appears to adopt a rule that is inconsistent
with other states when determining how a person becomes a party to an
agency 'procedure.' However, the difference between Kansas' rule and
other states that declined to adopt this rule seems to be the requirement
that the party has a specific interest in the agency outcome. For example,
in State ex rel. DePointi Aviation Co. Inc. v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Metro.
Air Commission, the court made the distinction between participating
simply by clarifying the interest and participating on the merits with a
particular interest that would be affected.86 Likewise, in Wood v. Metro.
Nashville & Davidson County Gov't the court in Tennessee specifically
rejected the holding that a person could become a party to the proceeding
if that person suffered only a general injury.8 7 Further, in states that did
allow participation in a public hearing or the submission of a written
comment to confer party status on the petitioners, each petitioner suffered
an individualized injury.88
8 50 P.3d 668, 677 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1204 (61
ed. 1990). The rejected definition is "the form and manner of conducting juridical
business before a court or judicial officer." Id
85 Bd. of County Comm'rs of Sumner County v. Bremby, 189 P.3d 494, 502 (Kan. 2008).
The Court also relied on the fact that the rule-making process is called a proceeding in
K.S.A. § 77-615, since the two processes are very similar. Id.
86 32 N.W.2d 560, 564 (Minn. 1948).
87 196 S.W.3d 152, 158 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
88 In Indianapolis Downs, L.L.C v. Ind. Horse Racing Comm'n, 827 N.E.2d 162, 170
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005), Downs had an individual interest in where the riverboat revenue
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Although K.S.A. § 77-611(b) does not mention a requirement for a
specialized injury, the Court held that a person must still meet the
constitutional standing test. Therefore, petitioners must suffer a
specialized injury in order to have standing. 89 With these two tests
properly combined, Kansas' rule is fairly consistent with other states' rule.
The fears that this holding will grant anyone and everyone standing
to contest agency actions are unfounded. It is argued that this holding will
allow citizens and organizations to constantly challenge permits making it
financially impossible for the permit holder to run its business due to high
court costs.90 It is true that the Court's holding makes it possible that a
person could become a party to an agency proceeding by merely sending a
letter or even a postcard with a comment about the agency action.91
However, the person must also fulfill the constitutional standing test and
therefore must plead and prove a specialized injury in order to have
standing. 92 Therefore, anyone and everyone will not have standing to
challenge an agency action.
It may be true that this new standing requirement could prevent
many businesses and individuals from gaining a permit that would have
environmental impacts. Therefore, a developer who wants to build a new
condominium may have trouble getting a building permit if the citizens
can show that the construction will cause water drainage damage or
possibly that the construction will merely damage the natural environment
of the neighborhood. These examples remain unanswered, but at least the
first seems plausible in light of the ease in which the Court allows
appellants to claim an environmental injury.
B. New Injury Standard for Environmental Cases?
would be allocated. Even in Medical Waste Assoc. v. Md. Waste Coalition, Inc., 612 A.2d
241, 249 (Md. 1990), which had the loosest requirement, the court still required the
person to have an interest in the outcome of the matter.
8 Bd. of County Comm'rs of Sumner County, 189 P.3d at 499.
90 Intervenor-Appellee's Supplemental Brief at 14, Bd. of County Comm'rs of Sumner
County v. Bremby, 189 P.3d 494 (No. 06-96658-S). For example, appellees point out that
Waste Connections had as of 2006, expended over $3,000,000 on the landfill, not
counting the litigation through the appeal and the Kansas Supreme Court. Id at 15.
91 1d. at 13-14.92 Bd. of County Comm'rs ofSumner County, 189 P.3d at 499, 505.
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The court rejects its traditional injury test and accepts as a
sufficient injury one that is both generalized and speculative. The Court
acknowledges that if the landfill is unsuitable and leaks, it will cause
contamination to the soil, groundwater, and surface water. However, the
Court then abandons the 'ifs' without explanation, and concludes that the
appellants will suffer an injury if the challenge to the permit is not
permitted. 93
The Court fails to distinguish cases like Winters where the court
refused to grant standing because multiple steps had to occur before the
petitioner would suffer an actual injury. 94 In this case, the landfill must
not be kept per state regulations, must leak into nearby water sources, and
then the appellants would have an injury. Further, the KDHE has a
Landfill Remediation Program designed for long-term groundwater
monitoring and landfill inspections. 95 The unit is responsible for
reviewing and approving corrective actions to remediate contaminants in
the ground water.96 However, the Court fails to even mention Kansas'
efforts to prevent water contamination and instead accepts appellants'
injury without sufficient analysis.
The Court also fails to discuss the argument that the injury alleged
by the appellants is merely an injury suffered by the rest of the community
and not individualized to the appellants. The only individualized injury
specifically pleaded by the appellants is the damage to the pond of Mr.
Holland's. However, Mr. Holland no longer has an interest in that land
since he died during the proceeding and only owned a life estate.9 7
9
'Id. at 506.
94 Winters v. Kan. Hosp. Med. Serv. Ass'n, 562 P.2d 98, 101-02 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977).
95 Kansas Department of Health and Environment: Assessment and Restoration Section,
http://www.kdheks.gov/ars/ (last visited October 26, 2008).
96 d
9 Intervenor-Appellee's Brief at 1, Bd of County Comm'rs, 189 P.3d 494 (No. 06-
96658-A). The Court refuses to dismiss Mr. Holland from the case despite claiming that
the court must take all facts pleaded as true and appellants pleaded that Mr. Holland
owned a life estate. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 189 P.3d at 507. Further, K.S.A. § 60-1801,
which describes actions that can survive the death of a party, does not include the current
type of action. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1801 (2008). Therefore, accepting all facts alleged
in the petition as true, the court should have dismissed Mr. Holland's action since he has
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Further, the Board never attempts to allege an individualized injury but
rather pleads that the community's water supply might be contaminated if
deficiencies in the landfill exist. The Court fails to explain how this is
different from trying to keep cedar trees in front of the court house98 or
challenging water rates99 since these decisions, like contamination of a
community's drinking water, affects all members of the community
equally. Further, the Court gives Tri-County much leeway by accepting
the water contamination injury and the injury to the unspecified real
property owned by Tri-County members who border the landfill site. 00
The fact that landfills have leaked and damaged the environment
may explain the Court's acceptance of this speculative, generalized injury.
In 1990, two-thirds of the solid waste generated in the United States was
disposed in landfills.o'0 The environmental hazard the appellants fear most
is leachate which is a contaminated solution that can seep into aquifers and
flow into nearby surface waters contaminating water supplies. An EPA
study showed that nearly 90 percent of municipal landfills have ground
water contamination and nearly 44 percent have surface water
contamination.103 Even though modem landfills are less likely to
no property interest near the landfill and thus cannot suffer an injury due to the issuance
of the permit.
98 See Linsea v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 753 P.2d 1292, 93, 96 (Kan. Ct. App. 1988).
99 Bodine v. Osage County Rural Water Dist. No. 7, 949 P.2d 1104 (Kan. 1997).
100 Bd. of County Comm'rs of Sumner County v. Bremby, 189 P.3d 494, 506 (Kan.
2008). The court fails to discuss that Tri-County's only named member no longer has a
property interest near the proposed landfill. See id. It is true that Tri-County alleges that
numerous members will suffer property damage and participated at the hearing. Id
However, Tri-County should have to specifically plead what property is harmed and a
person who participated at the hearing other than Mr. Holland in order to have standing.o' Christopher D. Knopf, CLOSING THE LOOP: REQUIRING DOUBLE-SIDED
COPYING AND NON-CHLORINE BLEACHED RECYCLED PAPER FOR FEDERAL
COURTPAPERS, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 345, 366 (1995).
102 John Rousaksis & Bernard A. Weintraub,, PACKAGING, ENVIRONMENTALLY
PROTECTIVE MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT, AND THE LIMITS TO
THE ECONOMIC PREMISE, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 947, 955 (1994).
103 Knopf, supra note 101, at 367.
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contaminate groundwater, leakage is still a risk. 104 In light of the mixed
history and public opposition of landfills, the Court's acceptance of a
"potential harm as well as an actual harm"',05 could be read as a step to
putting agency decisions with environmental impacts in the hands of
citizens.
Regardless of the reasons for the Court's holding, the Court
opened the door for citizens and organizations to challenge agency
decisions that affect the environment. This holding may hold dramatic
consequences for developers and agencies that make any decisions that
affect the environment by allowing citizens to challenge any agency
action. This holding may persuade interested permit seekers to avoid even
applying for a permit if the action will have environmental impacts.
Therefore, depending on how lax the Court remains with its environmental
injury standard, this holding could stifle development in Kansas. However,
at the cost of development, this case finally allows citizens and
organizations to have a voice that can be heard when agencies make
decisions that affect their community's environment.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's holding opens a path for citizens and organizations to
challenge agency decisions that might have a potential environmental
impact. Not only does the Court decide that citizens can become parties to
an agency hearing by merely voicing a concern during a public comment
period, but it also accepts a generalized, speculative injury. This holding
grants citizens quite a bit of power to challenge agency decision that will
have an impact on the environment. However, the holding fails to explain
whether this generalized, speculative injury concerning water
04 R.J. Slack, J.R. Gronow, & N. Voulvoulis, Household Hazardous Waste in Municipal
Landfills: Contaminants in Leachate, Science of the Total Environment, Vol. 337, Issue
1-3, 119, 120 (Jan. 20, 2005).
1o5 Robert L. Glicksman, Coal-Fired Power Plants, Greenhouse Gases, and State
Statutory Substantial Endangerment Provisions: Climate Change Comes to Kansas, 56
U. KAN. L. REV. 517, 561 (2007). This quote is by Secretary Bremby in his decision to
deny a permit for coal-powered plants in Kansas in which he explained that it would be
irresponsible to ignore potential harm to the environment. Id. at 561.
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contamination will be extended to air, trees, plants, or possibly even
aesthetic concerns. It is fair to say that until the Court answers these
questions, agencies and developers might be careful in making any
decisions that have public opposition which affect the environment.
The answer will come when this case is decided on the merits. The
deciding court will demonstrate to future petitioners as well as the current
appellants, whether the appellants' efforts were well spent or whether the
court will apply the usual deference standard to the agency decision and
find that the issuance of the permit was reasonable.
ERN P. SEELE
630
CHALLENGING AGENCY DECISIONS
631
